In a setting with multiple banks and differential information, we study how a shock propagates in the banking system due to strategic interactions between banks' managers and depositors. We construct a model in which a bank faces an exogenous shock and study the transmission of this shock in the interbank market due to financial linkages. We uniquely determine the unfolding of the financial crisis in equilibrium. Firstly, we show that an initial shock to a bank is transmitted to the banking system, thus increasing the financial fragility. The more interesting part of our analysis, however, is the role played by creditor banks in transmission of the shock. We show that, under certain circumstances, creditor banks increase the fragility of borrower banks by unwinding their claims to distance themselves from the line of contagion. Furthermore, our model predicts that even when creditor banks do not directly play an important role on the financial distress of their borrower banks, they amplify the sensitivity of the initial shock on their borrower banks. Our model shows that not only does the interbank market transmit shocks --and acts as a channel for contagion --but also that the endogenous liquidity in the interbank market can be reduced after the initial shock, thereby increasing the fragility of the whole system over and above the initial shock. † We are extremely grateful to Xavier Vives for all his help and guidance. We also thank Franklin Allen, Arnoud Boot, Amil Dasgupta, Paolo Fulghieri, Roman Inderst, Anjan Thakor, Tim Van Zandt and seminar participants at University van Amsterdam (UvA).
Introduction
The importance of …nancial linkages among banks in the propagation of a crisis can hardly be disputed. Small shocks caused by the failure of a bank can easily snow ball into a crisis, the dimensions of which can be hard to imagine. There are several channels that could play an important role in the transmission of the initial shock. Focussing purely on rational explanations, the failure of a bank could provide adverse information about other banks with similar features.
Thus, in a Bayesian framework, learning by rational agents could precipitate a …nancial crisis once the depositors have observed the failure of a bank (Chen, 1999) . Another important channel that could play a role in the transmission of a crisis are the balance sheet connections among banks (Allen and Gale, 2000) . For example, after an initial shock to one bank, banks connected to the failed bank would receive a negative shock. Furthermore, strategic interactions among banks in the interbank market could modify the impact of this initial shock in the system. In this paper, we focus primarily on how a shock is transmitted across the system due to balance sheet connections among banks. In particular, we analyze whether the interbank market ampli…es or attenuates the fragility caused by the initial shock.
We have in mind the metaphor of a line of dominoes where the …rst piece goes down and starts hitting the other dominoes which are close to it -i.e., we think of banks as dominoes and, level of deposits in adjacent banks as a measure of proximity of the dominoes. In particular, we want to know what happens to the second domino in the line, after the …rst one has gone down. Thus, in the context of banks, the …rst question which we are interested in is the following: Does the probability of failure of a bank depend on the proximity to the bank that initially failed? The more interesting question that arises is that unlike a dominoes'game, in which the pieces are static, when one considers a banking system, managers of banks can take actions after the initial shock to 2 move away from the line of contagion. To put it more simply, it is as if the pieces of the dominoes' game were able to adjust their positions. Furthermore, the actions of the managers of banks are in ‡uenced both by their own depositors and also by the depositors of other banks. Therefore, not only are our dominoes not static but they also have another layer down (the depositors of banks) that can completely alter the transmission of the initial shock. Hence, we study how banks behave in the interbank market -after an initial shock-taking into consideration the reaction of all the depositors. In consequence, to pursue our analysis on the transmission of an initial shock through the interbank market, we assume a model that consists of three banks: Banks A, B and C with their respective depositors (refer to …gure 1):
Bank B has a deposit AB in bank A, which fails exogenously at the beginning of the model. Bank C (the creditor) has a deposit BC in bank B (the borrower). Both banks have their own small depositors, who receive private signals about the fundamentals of their respective banks. In addition, we assume that the manager of bank C has perfect information about the fundamentals of her own bank and bank B. After the initial shock (failure of bank A), depositors of bank B (the small depositors and the manager of bank C) decide whether to withdraw their deposits early. After this game, a public signal is released about the level of early withdrawals in bank B. Intuitively, this public signal captures the extent of problems -queues of depositors-faced by bank B. Once depositors in bank C observe the public signal, they decide whether to withdraw their deposits early. Based on the previous structure, we analyze the following questions regarding the change in the ex-ante probability of failure of bank B: Firstly, how does the ex-ante probability of failure of bank B change with the level of deposit that bank B has with the failed bank A? We refer to this as the '…rst layer'e¤ect. Secondly, how does the level of deposit held by the creditor bank C in bank B a¤ect the ex-ante probability of failure of bank B? We refer to this as the 'second layer' e¤ect. And …nally, how does an interaction of the …rst and the second layer a¤ect the ex-ante probability of failure of bank B? In other words, we want to check whether there is contagion of the initial shock through the interbank market and, at the same time, whether the interbank market can reduce, or amplify, both the probability of …nancial distress of debtor banks and also the negative impact of the initial shock on the …nancial system.
In order to pursue our analysis, we assume di¤erential information on the depositors' set of information. Hence, we are able to determine the unique equilibrium of the game and the associated equilibrium probability of failure for a bank. The main results of our paper are the following:
Firstly, we show that the probability of failure of bank B increases with its deposit in the bank that initially failed. Secondly, we highlight the dual nature of the interbank market, i.e. we show that bank C can either attenuate the crisis by provision of liquidity (to bank B) or can increase the liquidity risk of bank B. Finally, we show that in circumstances in which bank C does not directly play a signi…cant role in the distress of its borrower B, bank C indirectly ampli…es the negative impact of the initial shock in bank B.
The intuition driving the results is the following: after the initial shock, the depositors of bank B decide, based both on the fundamentals of their own bank and, on the exposure of their bank with 4 the failed bank, whether to withdraw their claims early. Higher the level of exposure of their bank with the failed bank, more likely it is that their bank faces higher level of early withdrawals (given that the liquidity of bank B has been reduced). Hence, under these circumstances, bank B might be solvent but illiquid, needing the support of its creditor bank C -it wants bank C not to liquidate the claim it holds in bank B. However, it is precisely under these circumstances that the potential liquidity that bank C can obtain from bank B is also reduced, thus increasing the fragility of the creditor bank C, which in turn increases the fragility of the borrower bank B. In consequence, the increase of coordination problems in the creditor bank (due to its depositors) increases the fragility of the borrower bank B. It is important to note that our result relies crucially on the fact that the large creditor is a bank i.e., the creditor has a fragile capital structure. Furthermore, we …nd the opposite results on the e¤ects of the second layer if the creditor C was not fragile.
In sum, not only do we …nd that the interbank market transmits initial shocks, but also that the liquidity in the interbank market can be reduced after the initial shock, thereby increasing the fragility of the whole system even more. Though our model is very stylized, it helps us show that strategic interactions in the interbank market can amplify the initial shock. Our results also point to the fact that capital structure of agents in the interbank market can play a crucial role in the propagation of a crisis.
Though the results of our model highlight the importance of strategic interactions among banks in the interbank market (taking into account the actions of depositors) during the unfolding of a …nancial crisis, there is a dearth of empirical evidence regarding the behavior of banks during a crisis. However, one study to take note of was conducted during the great depression by the Federal Reserve (1938) that looked at deposit losses experienced by banks prior to closing. The main …ndings of the study were that large deposits decreased much more prior to bank suspensions than small deposits. More importantly for our analysis, the study also …nds that interbank deposits were extremely quick to leave banks experiencing trouble, declining at a rate of over three times that of demand deposits. This …nding coupled with the …nding that some of the suspended banks were …nancially sound, suggests that there might be other forces (as shown in our results) at work driving the behavior of banks in the interbank market. 1 The results of our model are also consistent with the …ndings of Iyer and Peydró-Alcalde (2004) . Firstly, they show the signi…cance of the …rst layer e¤ect. Secondly, they show that the interaction of the …rst and the second layer matters, even though the second layer e¤ect by itself is not an important factor in explaining depositor runs.
Our work is related to a number of others: Rochet and Vives (2004) also study runs on banks due to coordination problems among the participants in the interbank market, thereby showing how the interbank market may fail. Rochet and Tirole (1996) use monitoring as a means of triggering correlated crises: if one bank fails, it is implied that other banks have not been properly monitored, and a general collapse occurs. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) analyze contagion through credit chains amongst lenders and entrepreneurs. Though their focus is to study balance sheet connections as a source of contagion, they do not concern themselves with depositors. Since our aim is to understand contagion via the interbank market taking into consideration depositors'reactions, the two papers which are closest to us are the ones by Allen and Gale (2000) and Dasgupta (2004) . Allen and Gale (2000) model contagion as an equilibrium phenomenon in a multiple bank setting. The main driving force behind their model is the liquidation by banks of their interbank holdings to meet excess demand for liquidity. They endogenize the interbank market claims and show that in equilibrium there can be contagion in the interbank market. Their model presents several equilibria and hence they do not have a speci…c prediction on how di¤erent level of deposits among banks can in ‡uence the expected probability of failure of a bank which is the main purpose of our paper. Dasgupta (2004) , however, has a unique equilibrium in his model. He also studies 1 See also Wicker (2000) pages 2, 39, 82,130, 141, 143 and 144. 6 the spread of crises due to …nancial connections among banks. In his paper, …nancial contagion is modelled as an equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic setting with incomplete information and multiple banks. The main result of the paper is that a contagious bank failure occurs with a positive probability and that reduces the incentive to use the interbank market. Furthermore, the direction of the contagion is from debtor to creditor banks. The emphasis of his paper is to endogenize interbank market claims when there is a positive probability of contagion ex-post, and to show that the main channel of contagion goes from borrower banks to creditor banks.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on contagion due to …nancial linkages in the following way: Our study incorporates in a uni…ed framework the three dominant forces which a¤ect the unfolding of a …nancial crisis: the …rst layer e¤ect (debtor banks'behavior), the second layer e¤ect (creditor banks'behavior), and the e¤ect caused by the interaction of the …rst and the second layers. In consequence, we obtain testable predictions on how these three forces a¤ect the unfolding of a …nancial crisis. More importantly, we show that creditor banks (taking into account all the depositors'actions) can dramatically alter the propagation of the crisis. In a more general context, our paper highlights the role of the capital structure of agents in determining the fragility of the system The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the model. In section 3, we analyze the unique equilibrium of the model. Section 4 contains the main results of the paper and section 5 concludes.
Model
Consider a three period -t = 0; 1; 2-economy with three banks denoted by A, B and C. We consider the following structure to be prevailing at time 0 (before any action in the model is taken): where:
The I units of illiquid assets pay o¤ a total random return R( i ) at t = 2, where i represents the underlying fundamentals of bank i, where i = B; C. There is, however, a liquidation cost if assets are liquidated prematurely (i.e., at t = 1). In this case, bank i can only obtain a maximum payo¤ (i.e., liquidating all its I units) of ( i ) R( i ): We assume that both banks'fundamentals are distributed independently and uniformly between L and U .
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The cash amount held by each bank grows at the risk-free rate, which is set at zero.
The depositors are risk neutral and do not have liquidity needs at the intermediate date -i.e., there are no depositors who necessarily need to consume at t = 1.
All deposits are demandable debt and pay o¤ the following:
-Unless the bank fails at the intermediate date, a depositor obtains a payo¤ of 1 if she withdraws before maturity (we will refer to them as early depositors); and a return r( i )
if she waits until maturity (we will refer to them as late depositors).
-If the bank cannot satisfy the claims by its early depositors, the bank fails. The early depositors obtain the value of the liquidated bank, and the late depositors receive a payment of zero. 2
The equityholders are risk neutral. They are passive and they receive the residual payo¤s at maturity.
The decision over a bank's deposit in other banks is delegated to the manager of the bank, who maximizes her bank's equityholders'value. 3
Information and Timing
At t = 0 bank A fails. In consequence, there is a shock to the asset side of bank B since it has a deposit of AB units in bank A. Afterwards, each depositor of bank B receives a private signal about B ; the underlying fundamentals of bank B. The signal received by a small depositor i is about the underlying fundamentals of bank B and bank C.
After all depositors of bank B have received their private information, they play -i.e., they withdraw early from -or remain in-bank B. Once they have initially played, depositors of bank C receive a public signal about the early withdrawals by the small depositors of bank B. Intuitively, this public signal represents the fact that depositors of other banks can observe queues of depositors running to their bank or, they learn that through media releases. Apart from this public signal, each depositor of bank C receives a private signal about C ; the underlying fundamentals of bank C. The signal received by depositor i is c i = C + i , where i is uniformly distributed on [ e C ; +e C ] and is independent of the rest of errors in the model. Given the private signals about the underlying fundamentals of bank C and the public signal about the early withdrawals in bank B, the depositors of bank C withdraw early from -or remain in-bank C.
Public Signal
The public signal re ‡ects the level of early withdrawals by small depositors in bank B: 4 The public signal -that we assume-captures the following: when there is a low level of withdrawals in bank B, the public signal s(w B ) will indicate that the level is low (L) with probability one (where w B represents the level of early withdrawals by small depositors of bank B). We de…ne low level (w B w B ) as the case in which even if bank C would withdraw completely its claim at the intermediate date, it would not imply the failure of bank B. In the same way, when there is a high level of withdrawals in bank B, the public signal s(w B ) will indicate that the the level 4 The intuition about this public signal is stated in the previous subsection.
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is high (H) with probability one. We de…ne high level (w B > w B ) as the case in which even if bank C would remain in bank B, this bank would fail due to the high level of early withdrawals by small depositors. However, we assume that there is an intermediate region of early withdrawals in which there is confusion. This speci…cally means that the public signal will either take a high value (H) with probability one half or, a low value (L) with probability one half. This intermediate region can have a measure that tends to zero and, it is de…ned by the level of early withdrawals (w B < w B w B ). In consequence, we assume the following public signal s(w B ) for the intermediate region:
(1)
Time Line
We can now summary the extensive form of the game as follows:
At time t = 0 :
-Bank A fails.
At time t = 1 :
-The small depositors of bank B receive private information about the underlying fundamentals of bank B. Manager of bank C receives perfect information about the underlying fundamentals of both bank B and bank C.
-All depositors of bank B independently choose whether to withdraw early from bank B based on their information set. Early depositors are paid.
-The public signal s(w B ) is released. We denote by (s(w B )) the game de…ned by the previous extensive form.
Assumptions
We assume that there exist a level of fundamentals U > 0 such that if bank i liquidates -at the intermediate date-all its I units of illiquid assets, the value obtained is restricted to:
This assumption implies the existence of an upper dominance region or "supersolvency" zone, which is needed for the uniqueness of the equilibrium. 5 It implies that when the fundamentals belong to this region, a depositor would remain in the bank independently of what she thinks other depositors would do. 6
5 See Morris and Shin (2004) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) for complete details on the conditions needed for uniqueness of the equilibrium in global games. 6 The upper dominance region or supersolvency zone is explained in detail when the equilibrium of the game is derived.
If bank i does not fail at intermediate date, we assume that the payo¤ R( i ) from the illiquid assets is 1 + i and, the payo¤ r( i ) for a late depositor is (1 + i ), where > 0 and close to zero. , the payo¤ for an early small depositor is 1 and the payo¤ for a late small depositor is (1 + B ). The payo¤ to bank C is w BC at the intermediate date and
at maturity, where w BC are the units withdrawn early by the manager of 7 All we need is that the return for the late depositors -given that the bank does not fail at the intermediate datedepends on the fundamentals. For instance, this could be due to a probability of failure on the risky investments, which -in turn-depends on the fundamentals of the bank (see Peydró-Alcalde, 2004) . Alternatively, see Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) for an alternative justi…cation on this assumption. Bank B fails at t = 1 if the level of early withdrawals by small depositors exceeds the cash held by bank B -i.e., w B > w B . The reason is twofold: …rstly, it is due to the assumption that -if the fundamentals are not in the upper dominance region-the prematurely liquidated illiquid assets are worthless. Secondly, given that bank A has failed, the value that bank B can obtain from its deposit in bank A is zero. In consequence, for w B > m AB , the payo¤ for an early small
However, late depositors and equityholders obtain a payo¤ of zero.
Action taken by the manager of bank C is crucial in determining the failure of bank B:
The last Let q(t) be the payo¤ that bank C obtains as a depositor from bank B at time t (both at the intermediate date t = 1 and at maturity t = 2). There are two di¤erences between the payo¤s for bank C and for bank B: The …rst one is that bank C does not have a large depositor. The second one is that bank C obtains some payo¤ via its deposit in bank B -re ‡ected in the random variable q(t). Hence, the payo¤s are as follows:
Bank C fails at the intermediate date if the level w C of early withdrawals by its depositors exceeds the liquidity that bank C has at t = 1. Hence, for w C > m BC + q(1), an early depositor obtains (m BC + q(1))=w C and a late depositor obtains zero payo¤. 13 Otherwise, if
, bank C does not fail. In consequence, an early depositor obtains a payo¤ of 1 and a late depositor obtains an payo¤ of (1 + C ): 14 3 Equilibrium
Preliminaries
The decision on early withdrawal by a depositor depends on her expected value of remaining in the bank versus withdrawing early. Since we have assumed that a depositor does not have 1 2 Otherwise, if bank C's fundamentals are in the upper dominance region, i.e. C 2 [ U C ; U ], bank C does not fail at the intermediate date. Thus the payo¤s for an early depositor and a late depositor would be 1 and (1 + C ) respectively. See more on this on the section about the equilibrium.
1 3 The shareholders of bank C would also obtain a zero payo¤. 1 4 The shareholders would receive at maturity the residual payo¤s:
liquidity needs at the intermediate date, her decision on early withdrawal depends only on both the fundamentals of her bank and on her beliefs about other depositors'actions. Intuitively, the belief of higher fundamentals will favor the decision of remaining in the bank, whereas the belief of higher early withdrawals by other depositors will favor the decision of running to the bank. Moreover, as we will see in more detail bellow, a depositor is not only interested on the decisions of other depositors from her own bank, but also, on the decisions by depositors of the other on-going bank, i.e. the one linked to hers through the interbank market. 15 There are, however, situations in which a depositor takes her decision only based on the fundamentals of her own bank (i.e., her belief about other depositors'actions does not matter in deciding whether to withdraw early or not). On one hand, when the fundamentals of a bank are very strong -the bank is "supersolvent"-a depositor from this bank will remain in it, regardless of what she thinks about other depositors'actions. This is because the fundamentals are very strong; hence, the bank will survive independently of the level of early withdrawals that it will face. On the other hand, when the fundamentals of a bank are very weak -the bank is insolvent-a depositor will withdraw early, regardless of what she thinks about other depositors' actions. Obviously, since the bank is insolvent, the value, which the bank will generate at maturity, will not be attractive enough, precipitating the run from this depositor. In consequence, in those states of nature, a depositor would take her decision only based on the fundamentals of her own bank.
We now proceed to delimit these two zones or regions. In particular, if the fundamentals of bank i are such that i 2 [ U i ; U ], it will be optimal for a depositor of bank i not to withdraw early. This follows from the fact that even if all the other depositors of bank i would withdraw, the bank would not fail. Thus a depositor would obtain a higher payo¤ remaining in the bank than withdrawing early ((1 + i ) versus 1, where i > 0). This follows from the assumption that the value of the liquidated assets, at the intermediate date, is higher as the value of the assets are higher -i.e., ( i ) = 1, for a i 2 [ U i ; U ], which implies that the bank will not fail at t = 1. 16 . The previous range of fundamentals is called upper dominance region or "supersolvency" zone. Instead, if the fundamentals of the bank i are such that i 2 [L; 0], it will be optimal for a depositor of bank i to withdraw early. This follows from the fact that even if all the other depositors of bank i would remain, she would obtain a higher payo¤ withdrawing early than remain in bank i (1 versus
(1 + i ), where i 0). The previous range of fundamentals is called lower dominance region or insolvency zone. 17 We know that if the fundamentals of a bank i are in one of the two extreme zones, a depositor of bank i will have an easy strategy: withdraw early in the insolvent zone and remain in the bank in the "supersolvent" zones. However, when the fundamentals of bank i are not in those extremes zones, i.e. i is in the intermediate region [0;
U i ], bank i is solvent but illiquid: if all its depositors remain, bank i does not fail. However, if all of them withdraw early, bank i fails. As a consequence, this region of fundamentals presents a strategic problem for the depositors -i.e., there is a coordination problem among the depositors. Furthermore, the problem is even more complicated since the coordination problem is not only among the depositors of one bank, but also, there is a coordination problem among the depositors of the two on-going banks. For instance, if we would assume that the depositors have perfect information about the fundamentals -or, more generally, they do not have di¤erential information-, depositors would coordinate themselves perfectly on their actions and, in consequence, the game would present four equilibria: both banks fail, both banks survive, and one bank survives and the other fails. Since the ex-ante probabilities of the di¤erent equilibria are not endogenously determined, it would not be possible to analyze the questions that we want to address in this paper: how does the probability of failure of the borrower bank B change depending on its claim with the failed bank A ( AB ), on its claim with the creditor bank C ( BC ) and, on the interaction of both claims? We can, however, answer to the previous question if we assume -as we do in this paper-that depositors have di¤erential information on the fundamentals.
In this case, we are able to link both banks'depositors'strategies and we can determine the unique equilibrium of the game -even when the precision of their signals tend to in…nite. Hence, we are able to perform the comparative statics of the unique equilibrium and answer our initial questions on the unfolding of a …nancial crisis.
Strategies and Equilibrium
We focus on threshold strategies for the depositors. This is not restrictive since -as we will showthey use those ones in the unique equilibrium of the game. However, the manager of bank C apparently has a more complicated strategy as we can see in the following characterization of the We check in the appendix that as the errors of depositors'private signals e i , i 2 fB; Cg; tend to 0 + , the strategy of the manager of bank C converges to a threshold one -i.e., she withdraws BC Since we are interested in this paper on the comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to the interbank market claims ( AB and BC ). And, given that this analysis is more simple as the error of the private signals tend to zero, we prove -in the appendix-the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium as the error is positive but very close to zero. We now state the result about existence and uniqueness and, then, explain intuitively how to obtain the equilibrium threshold strategies of the depositors and the equilibrium strategy of the manager. We assume that all agents use the equilibrium strategies de…ned by the previous proposition.
Hence, a depositor i with a private signal b i equal to b would be indi¤erent between withdrawing early and remaining in bank B. The payo¤s that she expects depends on the fundamentals of both bank B and bank C, and on the public signal s(w B ) about the early withdrawals that will be released after they initially play. Let B ( B ; s(w B ); C ) be the payo¤ of remaining in bank B versus withdrawing early. We know -from the subsection on payo¤s-that the payo¤s B ( B ; s(w B ); C ) are a¤ected by the fundamentals of bank C via the early withdrawal w BC ( B ; C ; s(w B )) by the that a depositor with a signal b withdraws early. However, the decision of the manager of bank C is very di¤erent. We will see that she can have a strict preference of withdrawing only part of the claim of bank C in bank B early. Therefore, her strategy is de…ned from the fundametals to the whole range between 0 and BC : manager of bank C. Furthermore, if a complete early withdrawal by bank C -w BC = BCimplies the failure of bank B -i.e., if bank B's fundamentals are such that B 2 [ B B )-the payo¤s B ( B ; s(w B ); C ) are crucially determined by the action of the manager of bank C. Therefore, the payo¤s -of remaining in bank B versus withdrawing early-for a depositor of bank B are the following:
Where denotes the indicator function, which takes the value one if there is an early withdrawal w BC from the manager of bank C such that implies the failure of bank B. Therefore, since a depositor i of bank B with a private signal b has an expected value of withdrawing early which is equal to the expected value of remaining in bank B, thus, we obtain the following equation: Once the depositors of bank B have initially played, the depositors of bank C receive a public signal s(w B ), which re ‡ects the level of early withdrawals by small depositors of bank B. We assume a depositor i of bank C who has a private signal c i equal to c (s(w B )), where s(w B ) 2 fH; Lg: Once this depositor has observed the public signal s(w B ), she updates her belief about her bank's potential liquidity at time t = 1 -i.e., she uses the updated cumulative distribution function F (w B =s(w B )) over the level of early withdrawals by the small depositors of bank B. The maximum liquidity q M (1), which her bank can obtain at time t = 1 through its deposit with bank B, depends on the early withdrawals w B , and is the following: 
where F C is implicitly de…ned by w C (
, where q M (1) is a function of w B -i.e., the level of fundamentals of bank C such that the early withdrawals in bank C are equal to the value of the liquidated assets. Therefore, the depositor i of bank C with signal c (s(w B )) i2fL;Hg has an expected value of withdrawing early from bank C which is equal to the expected value of remaining in her bank. Hence, we obtain the following equation:
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From the previous equation, we obtain the thresholds for a depositor of bank C -i.e., c (H) and c (L). Solving for the equation (4) given the thresholds for a depositor of bank C, we obtain the threshold b for a depositor of bank B. As the errors of the private signals of depositors of bank B and bank C tend to zero, we obtain the following solution:
where
Remark 2 It is easy to notice that if P (i) -i.e. the probability of liquidity needs from bank C; given the public signal i-increases, the threshold b increases, thereby increasing, the ex-ante probability 
Results
The purpose of our paper is to analyze how strategic interactions among di¤erent agents in the interbank market a¤ect the unfolding of a …nancial crisis. In particular, we are interested in the strategic interactions of two kinds of agents: the manager of a creditor bank and both her own bank's depositors and the borrower bank's depositors. We want to know how the strategic interactions of these agents a¤ect the possibility of contagion of the initial shock and, moreover, the role of the interbank market in attenuating/amplifying the initial shock.
In order to pursue our analysis, we want to know how the probability of failure of the borrower bank B changes: Firstly, with respect to the level of its claim AB with the initial failed bank A (…rst layer e¤ect). Secondly, with respect to the level of the claim BC that the creditor bank C has in the borrower bank B (second layer e¤ect). And, …nally, with respect to the interaction of the level of the two claims AB and BC (interaction of the …rst and second layer). By answering these questions, we want to check if the interbank market serves as a mechanism for transmitting an initial shock. Furthermore, we want to understand under which circumstances the interbank market is good at providing liquidity and, secondly, whether this latter function is altered when there has been a negative shock in the system.
Proposition 3
If the level AB of deposit of bank B in bank A increases, the threshold for a depositor of bank B strictly increases, i.e. @b @ AB > 0.
The intuition is simple. The higher the level of deposits that bank B has in the failed bank A, the higher the extent of negative shock it faces. This implies a higher level of deterioration of the assets of bank B. Thus increasing the aggressiveness of the depositors of bank B and, hence, increasing the threshold b . As a consequence, there is an increase in the …nancial distress of bank B, hence, the interbank market transmits shocks.
We have just seen that the interbank market can act as a channel for contagion of an initial shock. But, at the same time, scholars like Goodhart, among others, have said that nowadays the interbank market can always provide liquidity to solvent but illiquid banks. More formally, it would imply that interbank markets would reduce the liquidity problems that solvent banks could receive from negative shocks. 21 The following propositions tries to address the validity of this claim.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique, and …nite, level of banks' fundamentals U ( AB ; BC ; m)
such that @b @ BC < 0 if and only if U > U :
If the fundamentals of the banking system are strong, the expected intermediate liquidity needs
for bank C are low, then, higher level of deposits held by bank C in bank B lowers the strategic uncertainty of the small depositors of bank B. 22 In consequence, the threshold of small depositors of bank B is reduced -in turn-reducing the probability of failure of bank B.
The following proposition, and the associated corollary, state the most important result of the paper, which implies that the interbank market not only transmits initial shocks -contagion via interbank claims-but also it can amplify these shocks via a reduction of the liquidity available in the market.
Proposition 5 There exists a unique, and …nite, level of banks' fundamentals U ( AB ; BC ; m)
such that @ 2 b @ AB @ BC > 0 if and only if U < U ; where U is strictly higher than U :
The implication of this proposition is that the interbank market, depending on the fundamentals of the banking system, worsens the fragility of a bank which has an initial negative shock (in our model, this negative shock comes through the exposure, via the interbank market, to the failed bank A). To put the previous claim into the context of the model: from the …rst proposition, we know that higher percentage of deposits of bank B in the failed bank A implies higher negative impact on bank B: Furthermore, proposition (5) states that this negative impact can even be ampli…ed as the level of deposits that bank B has from bank C increases. In this case, this implies a higher probability of …nancial distress for the borrower bank B: In consequence, the interbank market can amplify the initial shock. 23 In sum, the previous e¤ects imply that not only does the interbank transmit initial shocks from borrowers to creditors, but also, the initial shock can be ampli…ed by creditor banks via a reduction of the expected liquidity available in the interbank market.
Corollary 6 There exists an " > 0 such that if @b @ BC 2 ( ; + ), the threshold of a depositor of
The corollary is derived due to the result that U is strictly higher than U . This is because for certain region of fundamentals, higher level of fundamentals imply a reduction of the negative impact that the creditor bank C can have on the borrower bank B -i.e., basically as the fundamentals are higher, the liquidity needs of the creditor bank C are lower, thus reducing the negative interaction (vicious circle) from the creditor bank's depositors with those depositors in the borrower bank B.
The corollary implies that even under circumstances when higher level of deposits held by bank C in bank B by itself does not play an important role on the probability of failure of bank B, not only do we still …nd that the level of depositor runs are increasing in the extent of the initial shock, but also that the negative e¤ect of initial shock is ampli…ed by increasing the level of deposits held by bank C in bank B. Since the …rst layer always a¤ects bank B negatively, the result states that even though an increase of deposits from the creditor bank would not signi…cantly a¤ect the incentive for the threshold depositor to withdraw early, it would amplify the negative threshold depositor's reaction to a higher shock from the initial failed bank. 24 That is, the corollary states that, even if higher level of BC does not signi…cantly a¤ect the threshold b , it a¤ects the threshold depositor's sensitivity to the …rst layer @b =@ AB . Furthermore, it ampli…es the negative impact of the …rst layer @b =@ AB . 25 Therefore, even though the level of the deposits held by the creditor bank does not -by itselfincrease the …nancial fragility of its borrower, it ampli…es the sensitivity of the negative shock that its borrower bank B received via its deposit with the failed bank. We now proceed to explain in more detail why the interaction of the …rst and second layer matters in the model when the second layer e¤ect is not relevant. This is due to the following reasoning: If the level of deposit of bank C in bank B increases, this a¤ects the the threshold depositor's sensitivity to the …rst layer (i.e.,
BC a¤ects @b =@ AB ) through three ways:
2 4 We sometimes abuse the notation by calling threshold depositor a depositor, who has a signal equal to threshold one.
2 5 This results does not rely on the nature of the public signal or the number of creditor banks.
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Firstly, it changes the borrower bank's small depositors' incentive of early withdrawal -i.e., it changes the threshold b . This …rst e¤ect can be positive or negative depending on the level of the fundamentals (as it has been explained in the second proposition). However, since we are assuming that @b =@ BC is close to zero, we know that the …rst e¤ect is not relevant.
Secondly, it changes the creditor bank's small depositors'incentive of early withdrawal -i.e., it changes the threshold c . Given the initial level of shock, higher the linkage of the bank C with bank B, higher the negative impact of the initial failed bank A on bank C. In consequence, this increases the aggressiveness of depositors of bank C, thus increasing the probability of distress of bank B. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze whether the interbank market serves as a mechanism to transmit shocks and if further interaction among agents in this market can reduce, or amplify, these initial shocks.
The agents that we are interested in are managers of banks and depositors. Thus in order to pursue this analysis, we set up a simple model with only two on-going banks -one is a creditor bank and the other is a borrower bank, which receives an initial negative shock. These banks have depositors, who can withdraw their deposits early based on their information set. Moreover, there is an active manager for the creditor bank, i.e. she takes her decisions based on internalizing all the depositors'actions.
We ask ourselves the following questions: How does the probability of failure of the borrower bank change with the level of its claim with the failed bank, and how does the creditor bank a¤ect this probability? In order to answer these questions, we assume a model in which the agents have di¤erential information, and we determine the unique equilibrium of the game. We …nd the following results: Firstly, the probability of failure of the borrower bank increases with its linkage with the failed bank (…rst layer e¤ect). Secondly, even if higher fraction of deposits held by the creditor bank does not directly a¤ect the probability of distress of the borrower bank, it ampli…es the sensitivity of the borrower bank to the initial shock. These results are consistent with the …ndings of Iyer and Peydró-Alcalde (2004) . Thus, we show that not only does the interbank market transmit initial shocks but it can also amplify the initial shocks by reducing the liquidity in the interbank market, and hence, increasing the …nancial fragility of the banking system.
Appendix
In this appendix, …rstly, we completely characterize the equilibrium of the game (s( B )) and show its existence and uniqueness. And, secondly, we provide the partials derivatives that support the main results of the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We separate the proof on four steps. In the …rst step, assuming the existence of the threshold equilibrium, we characterize some important variables. In the second step, we …nd the threshold equilibrium both for a depositor of bank B and bank C -i.e., we …nd b and c (i) First step: Firstly, we want to know at the threshold equilibrium for a depositor of bank i, the distribution of both the fundamentals of bank i and also the number of early withdrawals w i : We assume that a depositor of bank C receives a signal c (i) and she observes that the public signal is s(w B ) = i, i 2 fL; Hg: We called this depositor -abusing the notation-the threshold depositor.
For her, C jc (i) is distributed uniformly between c (i) e C and c (i) + e C : This is due to the We can also notice the following relation between level of early withdrawals and fundamentals:
Applying the same reasoning for the threshold depositor at bank B, we …nd that B jb is Secondly, we want to know -given the public signal s(w B ) = i, i 2 fL; Hg-the distribution of the level of early withdrawals by the small depositors at bank B -i.e., f (w B =s(w B )): Since we are not interested speci…c w B , but on zones of w B , we present the density function in the following way:
Second step: We solve the game by backward induction. We substitute the above expressions in the equation (7) of the threshold depositor of bank C -given the public signal i-which implies the following equation:
If we take the errors of the private signals as zero, then, the threshold for a depositor of bank C is the following:
where q M (1; i) = 8 > > < > > :
The behavior of the depositors of bank C -summarized in the threshold c (i) determine the probability P (i) of liquidity needs by bank C; which is -in turn-internalized by the threshold depositor of bank B: Hence, substituting the equation (9) about P (i) in the equation (4) of the threshold depositor of bank B, we obtain the following expression:
Where P =
P (L)+P (H) 2
: Taking into consideration the function B (w B ) found in the …rst step of this proof, we obtain the threshold equilibrium represented by the equations 8, 9, 10 and 11 of page 16.
Third step: Firstly, we need to check that the threshold equilibrium of the game converges to the previous one -equation 8-as the error of the signals tends to zero. The only aspect, which we need to take care of, is that if the errors are not zero, the probability P (i) contains the threshold b : Hence, it implies that the equation for the threshold depositor of bank B is of second degree on b . However, as we will check now, one solution of the equation tends to in…nite, and the other one converges to the threshold represented by equation 8. To see this, we can notice that we can write P (i) as (A + Bb e B )=(C + Db e B ); where A; B; C and D depend on the speci…c public signal i and do not depend on the error of the signal. Substituting P (i) i2fL;Hg into the equation 18, we obtain the following equation of second degree on the threshold b :
where A0; B0; C0; D0 and E0 are functions of the parameters of the model, and do not contain the error of the private signal. We solve this equation as the error e B of the signal tends to zero.
One solution does not converge -tends to in…nite-whereas the other solution tends to D0=B0 -i.e., tends to equation (8).
Secondly, we need to see that this threshold equilibrium is unique and there is no other equilibrium with di¤erent strategies. We can notice …rst that the public signal s(w B ); which depositors of bank C receive, depends on the result of the actions from depositors of bank B, not on the fundamentals. 27 In consequence, once the depositors of bank C know the public signal i -as the error of the private signal tends to zero-they do not care about the strategies of the small depositors of bank B -since they know the money that their manager can extract from bank B and this is the only aspect that they internalize. Therefore, given the public signal, depositors of bank C do not take into account the strategies of depositors of bank B, and the game for the depositors of bank C is like the one that Goldstein and Pauzner (henceforth, G&P) analyzed. Therefore, the threshold is unique and there is not other equilibrium with di¤erent strategies for the depositors of bank C.
The game of the depositors of bank B -however-is di¤erent from the one in G&P. In here, there is the manager of bank C, which has to take into consideration both the fundamentals in bank B and the fundamentals of bank C (plus the public signal). However, for a given level of fundamentals of bank C, the threshold depositor of bank B knows that if w B > m AB , the manager of bank C will withdraw completely her bank's claim (w BC = BC ). Furthermore, if w B < m AB , the threshold depositor of bank B knows that the number of withdrawals by the manager of bank 2 7 They depend on the fundamentals via the strategies.
C (taking into consideration the action of her bank's depositors) will be increasing on w B : This implies that there is not other threshold equilibrium. Hence, the threshold equilibrium is unique.
Moreover, the game is almost identical to the one analyzed by G&P. In consequence, thanks to the fact that w BC is increasing in w B ; we could use a very similar proof to the one by G&P and
show that there cannot exist other strategies in an equilibrium.
Four step: We need to provide a characterization of the other variables of the unique equilibrium of the game. In concrete, the following variables:
The manager of bank C has an strategy w BC very simple: Since she has perfect information, she would withdraw from bank B only if either there is a liquidity problem in her own bank or, alternatively, if the fundamentals of bank B are low: 28
On one hand, if the fundamentals of bank B are low, B 2 [L; B ), the manager of bank C knows that bank B is going to fail independently of her action. Thus she obtains a higher expected payo¤ withdrawing early. Hence, when B 2 [L; B ), her strategy is:
On the other hand, if the fundamentals of bank B are high, B 2 [ B ; U ], the manager of bank C knows that bank B will not fail regardless of her action. Thus she obtains a higher expected payo¤ not withdrawing early. Therefore, she will withdraw only if there is liquidity problems on her bank. Hence, when B 2 [ B ; U ] her strategy is: 29 2 8 If the error eC tends to zero, the strategy og the manager of bank C converges to:
Finally, when the fundamentals of bank B are intermediate, B 2 [ B ; B ), the manager of bank C has an strategy which is almost identical to the previous case, except for one aspect. If she withdraws part of her bank's deposit on bank B to obtain liquidity for her own bank, she may cause the failure of bank B. This happens if the liquidity needed in her bank w C ( C ; s) (m BC ) is higher than the available cash in bank C : (m AB ) w B . Hence, the optimal decision in this case would be w BC = BC -given that bank B will fail after she withdraws. In consequence, when
her strategy is:
The level of fundamentals of bank B such that this bank fails independently of the action taken by the manager of bank C is:
The level of fundamentals of bank B such that this bank does not fail independently of the action taken by the manager of bank C is: 
The level 
and it depends on the strategy by the manager of bank C and, in consequence, on both the fundamentals of bank C and on the public signal s(w B ):
where q M (1) is given by equation 5 and depends both on the fundamentals of bank B and on the public signal s(w B ).
Proof of Proposition 2.
We need to di¤erentiate the threshold -b -for a small depositor of bank B with respect to bank B's deposit in bank A -AB : Let P be the expected probability of the failure of bank C given that the fundamentals of bank B are such that B 2 [ B ; B ) -i.e. P = 
Since all the terms in the expression above are positive, the proof is completed.
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Proof of Proposition 3.
Di¤erentiating bank B's small depositors' threshold -b -with respect to bank C's deposit in bank B, BC , we obtain the following expression: 
Let U be the level such that the above expression is zero. Solving the above equation for U, we obtain -implicitly-the value of U :
It is easy to note that U exists, is unique and …nite. To see the existence, we notice that if 
U L )]( b + 1): A su¢ cient condition it is that U tends to c (L): Furthermore, if BC increases the di¤erence will increase even more, thus, the left side of the equation (29) is higher than the right side. As a consequence, there is a level of fundamentals U that satis…es the equation (29). Finally, the expression (29) is decreasing on the upper bound U of fundamentals. 30 To see this, we just need to see that the threshold b is decreasing in U -see remark 2. In consequence, U is unique. And, this concludes the proof.
3 0 Maintaining constant the rest of the parameters-in particular, the lower bound of fundamentals L.
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Proof of Proposition 4.
We divide the proof in two steps. In the …rst one, we prove that the level U exists, is unique and …nite. In the second step, we show that U is strictly greater than U :
First step: we …rst need to obtain the cross partial derivative, which is the following: We can notice that this expression is decreasing in U , and by the argument used on the previous proof, we know that there exist a unique and …nite level of fundamentals U such that the previous expression is zero when U = U :
Second step: the last point is to check that U > U . In order to check it, we use the expression resulting of @b @ BC = 0 at U = U . And, we substitute it on previous equation and show that 
